COMMENTS
Bankruptcy: Enjoining Employers from Discharging
Employees Because of Chapter XIII Wage
Deduction Order.
Harvey Jackson was employed by International Harvester,
Farmall Works, earning take home pay of $105 per week. By
April, 1967, he was indebted to sixteen creditors for a total of
$8,469.89. Because of this over-extension, Jackson entered into a
Wage Earner Plan' which was approved on April 14, 1967.
However, because of drinking and marital problems, 2 he did not
make regular payments to the trustee. On January 24, 1968, at
the request of the trustee, the Referee entered an order requiring
International, Jackson's employer, to deduct $303 per week from
his pay and to turn it over to the trustee. International complied
with the order, but, in accord with the union contract, Jackson
was notified that he must arrange the release of that "demand
against wages" or suffer suspension and eventual termination. At
Jackson's request, the Referee permanently enjoined his employer
from suspending or firing him because of the wage deduction
order. International petitioned for review and dissolution of the
injunction. The Federal District Court, Northern District of

Illinois held, alfirMed: The Referee in Bankruptcy has authority
to enjoin an employer from terminating an employee because of
a Chapter XIII wage deduction order. In the absence of an
1. Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964). The Wage Earner Plan (also
referred to herein as, Chapter XIII, and Plan) is a voluntary proceeding whereby one who
earns his living by wages, salary, or commissions may arrange an extention or
composition of his debts. Payment is made out of the debtor's future earnings pursuant
to a plan submitted by him. Such payments are received by a trustee who distributes
them to the creditors covered by the plan. See generally C. NADLER, TIlE LAW OF
DEBTOR RELIEF, §§ 379-90 (1954); Note, Chapter XIII oJ the Bankruptcy Act: As
Maine Goes. So Should the Nation, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 329 (1968).
For a discussion of the status of secured creditors see Comment, EnJorcing a
Chapter XIII Wage Earner's Plan Over the Objection oJ a Secured Creditor, 6 SAN
Di-Go L. REV. 69 (1969).
2. In re Jackson, No. RI-BK-67-69, Opinion of the Referee, published in 43 R14. J.
20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Referee's Opinion].
3. In July, 1967, the Referee permitted reclamation of Jackson's 1966 automobile by
the secured creditor, reducing the original debt to approximarely $5000. 290 F. Supp. 872
(N.D. Ill. 1968).
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unreasonable burden upon the employer, such an injunction will
be sustained. In re Jackson, 290 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. 111. 1968).
Section 658 of the Bankruptcy Ac authorizes issuance of
wage deduction orders and enforcement of such orders "in the
manner provided for the enforcement of judgments." 5 Thus, if
the debtor's employer were to resist the order, the court could
levy execution upon the debtor's wages. 6 It would not be
necessary to go beyond section 658 to find permission for
execution. However, the injunction in Jackson goes beyond mere
enforcement of an order. In effect, it preserves the debtor's
future earnings upon which the Chapter XIII plan depends. With
his income thus preserved, the basis is provided for later support
of a section 658 order.
The Jackson court found authority for the injunction in
section 2(a)(15Y of the Act. That section invests the bankruptcy
court with equitable powers to do what "may be necessary for
the enforcement of the provisions of [the Act]." 8 It seems at first
reading that section 658 includes adequate protection for wage
deduction orders and that section 2(a)(15) adds nothing to the
power of the court. Section 2(a)(15), however, grants jurisdiction
broad enough to encompass protection of the entire Wage Earner
Plan. The Supreme Court has similarly employed this section of
the Bankruptcy Act in a different situation. In Continental Bank
v. Chicago, Rock Island Ry'. the holders of collateral notes were
enjoined from selling the collateral because the proposed sale
threatened to prevent the debtor-railroad from developing a
satisfactory reorganization plan. In sustaining the injunction, the
Court said:
4. II U.S.C. § 1058 (1964), which provides:.
During the period of extention, the court-l) shall retain jurisdiction of the
debtor and his property for all purposes of the plan and its consummation
and shall have supervision and control of any agreement or assignment,
provided for in the plan, in respect to any future earnings or wages of the
debtor; and
(2) may issue such orders as may be requisite to effectuate the provisions of
the plan, including orders directed to any employer of the debtor. An order
directed to such employer may be enforced in the manner provided for the

enforcement of judgments.
5. Id.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 69; see 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 29.08 (J. MOORE ed.,
14th ed. 1968).
7. 11 U.S.C. § I1(a)(15) (1964).
8. Id.
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[A railroad reorganization under section 77] is a special
proceeding which seeks only to bring about a reorganization,
if a satisfactory plan to that end can be devised. And to
prevent the attainment of that object is to defeat the very end
the accomplishment of which was the sole aim of the section,
and thereby render its provisions futile. 0
Taking a broad view of the language of section 2(a)(15), as the
Supreme Court has done, it can be seen that the injunction
sustained in the Jackson case was necessary not only to prevent
the wage deduction order from being an exercise in futility, but
also to protect all other provisions of the Wage Earner Plan.
It seems, moreover, that the validity of this analysis does
not depend upon the existence of a prior wage deduction. For
instance, if, because of the possibility of being subject to wage
orders, an employer were to terminate an employee who entered
into a Chapter XIII plan," an injunction to prevent such a
discharge would seem to be as well justified as was the injunction
inJackson.
While the injunction in the Jackson case prohibits
International from terminating the debtor because of the wage
order, the opinion of the court suggests possible unwarranted
extentions. The court states that the injunction does not bar
termination of the debtor for any other "reason of any
substance.' ' 2 The meaning of "substance" in this context is not
clear. If the court means that any subsequently named cause for
discharge must have some precedent in custom or contract' 3 to
avoid a presumption that it is a ruse to circumvent the
injunction, no difficulty is encountered in the "substance"
9. 294 U.S. 648 (1935).

10. Id. at 676.
I1.In Central Packing Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 672 (1961), the company published the
following shop rule:
WAGE EARNER PLANS: NOTICE: EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 16,
1957. THOSE EMPLOYEES WHO GO ON ANY -WAGE EARNER"
PLAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL. THOSE PEOPLE
PRESENTLY ON -WAGE EARNER"
PLANS WILL NOT BE
SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL UNLESS THEIR "AMOUNT DUE" IS
INCREASED OR THEY ENTER INTO A NEW PLAN.
The rule was not enforced as written. However, the possibility of such a rule existing and
being enforced is not as remote as a first.impression of the text might indicate.
12. 290 F. Supp. at 875.
13. See generally B. WERNE, I ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR CONTRACT,
Discharge and Discipline § § 20.01 - .63 (1963).
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requirement. However, if the court means that the cause for
termination must have what may be termed "factual substance,"
that is, that the employer must be able to evidence reasonable
cause, the requirement may be unjustified. Such a prerequisite
for discharge could easily be extended to situations not involving
a prior wage order or injunction. Thus, to obtain an extention of
the existing injunction pending aribitration, the debtor-employee,
in either case, would only need to show that there was reasonable
probability that an arbitrator would decide in his favor. 4 While
the purpose of the extention or temporary injunction would be
the same as in the Jackson case, either would seem to represent
an unwarranted intrusion on the right of the employer to
discharge persons who, in the employer's opinion, are unfit for
his purposes. The benefits to the debtor 15 and to the economy" in
completed Wage Earner Plans do not seem to outweigh the
burden of keeping such persons on the payroll even temporarily.
In finding that the wage deduction order did not impose an
unreasonable burden on the employer, the Jackson court
apparently relied on two factors: first, that the provision in the
union contract calling for termination because of demands on
wages was discretionary and that International's action was,
therefore, purely voluntary; 17 and second, that since International
was making more than 18008 voluntary deductions from wages
each week,9 one more would cause no serious hardship.
14. Two prerequisites to granting a temporary injunction are irreparable loss and
probability of success at a plenary hearing of the matter. E.g., Rothstein v. Manuti, 235
F. Supp. 39, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Irreparable harm in this instance would be the
probable necessity of converting the Wage Earner Plan to straight bankruptcy because of
the loss of income during the grievance procedures. See. e.g., Central Packing Co., 36
Lab. Arb. 672 (1961) (date of discharge to date of reinstatement, six months).
15. The primary benefits to the debtor are (I) maintaining status quo of assets; (2)
avoidance of the stigma of being adjudged a bankrupt; and (3) the satisfaction of having
debts paid. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, at § 20.01.
16. The benefit to the economy is the reduction of the vast losses to creditors
attendant to straight bankruptcy. For an indication of the past and potential value of
Chapter XIII in this regard see Nadler, The Problems oJ'the Insolvent Wage Earner, 16
Bus. LAW. 390, 396-97 (1961). One of the purposes of the chapter is to procure this
reduction. Chandler, The Wage Earner's Plan: Its Purpose, 15 *rAND. L. REV. 169
(1961).
17. The court said that the Plan and the wage order were 'in jeopardy because the
employer [was] invoking a contract provision, clearly within its discretion not to invoke
. ... " and that the injunction was needed to protect the income on which the Plan
depends "'because of International's purely voluntary action." 290 F. Supp. at 876.
18. Referee's Opinion, 43 Rii. J. at 20-21.
19. 290 F. Supp. at 878.
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International's collective bargaining agreement provided that
any employee who did not obtain a release of a writ of

garnishment or other demand against wages within seven days
would be suspended, and that "[t] o fail to present such release
• . . within [sixty days] will result in the employee's termination
. ...

"2

Thus, the court's characterization of the contract is not

supported by its language. International's action seems no more

discretionary and voluntary than the act of one who seeks redress
for breach of contract in the courts.
All employers may discharge employees whose wages are

garnished. An employer not subject to a collective bargaining
agreement may do so the first time he is served a writ of

garnishment'

However, where a union contract controls the

employer-employee relationship, the rule permitting termination

is generally restricted to situations in which garnishments have
become "so frequent" that they impose an intolerable burden
upon the employer.22 This limitation is of little help to the

employee, however, since the loss of income by the first
attachment often results in subsequent garnishments. Thus, the

right to discharge because of garnishments is often exercised or
threatened. As a result, wage earners have frequently been forced

into straight bankruptcy because they have lost their employment
or because bankruptcy provides a means of protecting their
jobs.2

3

In view of the dire consequences to the garnished

20. The section of the collective bargaining agreement is quoted in Referee's
Opinion, 43 REF. J. at 20 (emphasis added).
21. The right seems taken for granted. A search of the DECIiNNIAI, DIGEST. Master
and Servant, GroundsJor Discharge § 30(l) from 1658 to the present, produced no cases
directly on point. The proposition is supported in dictum in only two cases under that
heading. Chalker v. First F-ederal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 87, 126
N.E.2d 475 (C.P. 1955); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Cox. 145 Ky. 667, 141 S.W. 389
(1911).
22. See B. WERNE, supra note 13, at § 20.59; e.g., Bagwell Steel Co., 41 Lab. Arb.
303 (1963) (three garnishments - shop rule): Capital Packing Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 101
(1961) (three garnishments contract provision).
23. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in (al/ornia: .4 Stud.|" and Recommendatiot, 53
CAL. L. REV. 1214, 1234 (1965); Satter, Wage Assignment and Garnishment Cited as
Major Cause oJ BankruptcY in Illinois, 15 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 50 (1961).
To correct this problem the recently passed Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth
in Lending Act), PuB. L. No. 90-321, tit. Ill. §§ 301-07 (May 29, 1968), 82 STAT. 146.
effective July I, 1970, will prohibit the discharge of an employee because of "any one
indebtedness." Id. at § 304. The term "garnishment" is defined broadly enough to
include wage deduction orders from the bankruptcy court. Id. at § 302(c). The aggregate
liabilities of a debtor in Chapter XII will probably be construed as "one indebtedness,"
thus prohibiting the termination of a debtor because of a wage deduction order.
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employe&4 and for sake of comparison to wage deduction orders,
the burden which employers seek to avoid or eliminate should be
identified.
The burden imposed by garnishment is said to be the
bookkeeping expense. 5 However, if only accounting costs were
involved, the rule would seem unwarrantedly harsh. Rather the
involuntary nature of such process may cause other liabilities

and inconveniences. The garnishee-employer may be required to
appear in court as a stakeholder in the case of a disputed claim.

Failing that, he runs the risk of double liability! 6 Beyond these
legal contingencies, the employer may be subjected to frequent

calls from creditors.2 7 Moreover, worry and harassment outside
of work might affect the employee's

performance on the job. 28

Additionally there is a risk that a worker with access to money
or property belonging to the employer or customers will be
tempted to steal to make up for the sudden reduction in his

income. These potential expenses and inconveniences are indeed a
burden and an employee whose wages are garnished repeatedly is
justifiably dismissed.

In contrast to these several contingencies, bookkeeping
expenses are the only burden placed on the employer by a wage

deduction order. A wage order is essentially voluntary on the
part of the debtor. Although, in Jackson, the order was made at
the request of the trustee, the debtor had previously submitted his

future earnings to the control of the court. Accordingly, a wage
deduction order, by its terms, 9 should relieve the employer from
The importance of the holding in the Jackson case is not reduced by this Act. Many,
perhaps most, debtors will have suffered attachment of their wages before petitioning for
relief in the bankruptcy court. A wage deduction order issued subsequently would then be
the second, or later garnishment of a different debt and would not be protected by the
Act. The value of Title III of the Truth in Lending Act is that it will aid in avoiding
"inverse" defeat of Chapter XIII by giving wage earners time to get to the court while
still employed and eligible to have a Wage Earner Plan worked out.
24. Termination often only adds the finishing blow to an already sad story. E.g.,
Lester Engineering Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1268 (1965). The arbitrator in Borg-Warner
Corp., 14 Lab. Arb. 745, 746 (1950), points out that the threat of discharge may force
the employee to pay a disputed debt or accept non-conforming goods.
25. B. WERNE, supra note 13, at § 20.59; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Taylor,
115 So. 2d 898, 899-900 (La. App. 1959).
26. 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies § 100 (1954). The
possible legal expenses are many and varied. See Id. at §§ 101-06.
27. Moccasin Bushing Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 380 (1950).
28. Id.
29. For an example of a clearly worded order see United States v. Krakover, 377
F.2d 104, 105 (10th Cir. 1967).
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any liability to the debtor. Because the plan is designed to leave
the debtor with adequate funds for his daily living,:3 the danger
that he might steal from his employer is no greater than with the
average employee. Moreover, a confirmed plan should aid the
debtor in his work by relieving him of many of his debt worries.
Finally, the fact that the debtor has entered upon a Wage Earner
Plan is a clear indication that he is doing his best to extricate
himself from the situation which presents the threat of
inconvenience and undue expense to his employer.
In resting its determination upon the theory that one more
deduction will not hurt, the Jackson court has hit wide of the
mark. It is the voluntary nature of a wage deduction which
renders the burden reasonable. This relieves the employer of the
uncertainties and inconveniences involved in involuntary
proceedings like garnishments. If the reasoning of the court were
followed in future cases, an injunction of this kind would issue
only against large employers. Smaller companies, perhaps
nonunion, which make only those deductions required by law,
would be free from such an order of the court. With respect to
small companies, then, the basic incongruity of permitting the
decree of the bankruptcy court to bring about the defeat of the
plan it was administering would remain.
In view of this incongruous result, the foregoing comparison
of garnishment and wage deduction orders, and the purpose of
Chapter XIII (enabling debtors to avoid straight bankruptcy and
to avert the resulting losses to the economy), it seems that a wage
order should never be seen to impose a burden so unreasonable
as to justify permitting a debtor to be discharged because of it,
or to convert his plan to straight bankruptcy to avoid the job
loss. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that there are at
least two ways of further reducing the inconvenience of the
employer.
While the public policy of Chapter XIII may create a duty
on the part of the employer "to assist . . .in the rehabilitation
of the Debtor .... ":' this assistance need not be rendered

unnecessarily or free of charge. Mere convenience to the debtor
30. The Plan must be fair, equitable, and feasible in order to be confirmed.
Bankruptcy Act. II U.S.C. § 1056(3) (1964). Obviously, it would not be feasible if the
debtor could not live on the remainder after deduction.
31. 290 F. Supp. at 878.
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and the court does not appear to be adequate reason for
imposing this responsibility on the employer;32 therefore, a wage
deduction order should not issue automatically. The debtor
should be given every opportunity to make full regular
payments : and the court should require an explanation of any
failures in that regard.*4 Only when, as in the Jackson case, it
becomes apparent that the debtor will be unable to complete the
plan without such aid should an order to the employer be made.
Additionally, since the deduction will be as regular as the
debtor's pay check and for a definite period of time, the
employer's costs would seem to be determinable. The debtor
could, therefore, be assessed for those costs.35 It may be urged
that if the debtor's entire check were turned over to the trustee
for disbursement to the debtor and his creditors no expense at all
would be involved. However, the probable embarrassment of the
debtor before his co-workers would seem to be inconsistent with
the attempt of Chapter XIII to eliminate the stigma of being
adjudged a bankrupt?6 And, in the words of one Referee, that
3' 7
procedure is too reminiscent of the "company store.
32. The reason for the'injunction in Jackson was that it was necessary to protect the
Plan. If a wage deduction order were made primarily for convenience of administration,
the basis of a temporary injunction-irreparable loss-would be lacking. See note 14,
supra.
33. It seems that a Wage Earner Plan will be of more value to the debtor and the
economy if he is called on to exercise the self-discipline needed to make the payments
himself. Education of debtors has been urged as a necessary adjunct to Chapter XIII
proceedings. Cowans, Present Bankruptcy Act Defective. New Solutions Advocated,
Including Credit Counseling, 22 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 40 (1968); Hanford, Consumer
Bankruptcy: Some Underlying and Triggering Causes, 23 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 25
(1968); Meth, Ethical and Economic Considerations in Chapter XIII Proceedings, 36
REF. J. 41 (1962). However, it has been urged that the truly root problem is the inability
or refusal of many debtors to use discretion in making credit purchases before becoming
over-extended. Miller & Kopp, Abuses oJ Consumer Credit-A View fron the
Bankruptcy Court, 4 Bus. LAW. 241, 248 (1966). The bankruptcy court is not now
equipped to offer or compel remedial consumer finance education. It can, however,
require the debtor to exercise the self-discipline which may aid discretion later.
34. The court is able to oblige him to explain missed payments. See C. NADLER,
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, § 850d at 708-09 (2d ed. 1968) (sample Application for
Order to Show Cause, and Order, for use by the trustee).
35. If the expense of determining the actual cost of making the deduction, writing
the check and mailing it to the trustee were prohibitive, some reasonable amount (such as
the 10c or 15c per check charged by many banks) could be levied. Authorization of such
fees may require amendment of the Act; however, it is submitted that if the charge were
made to the trustee, it could be included under II U.S.C. § 1059(2) which provides for
payment of his actual and necessary expenses.
36. Q. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966).
37. Interview with the Hon. Arline Rossi, Referee in Bankruptcy, Southern District
of California, in San Diego. Cal., Feb. 2, 1969.
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Some Referees prefer wage deduction orders but,
nevertheless, have indicated that an order should issue only if the
employer is willing to cooperate.-8 Others have said that wage
deduction orders are essential to the success of the Wage Earner
Plans. "' Despite this preference and even insistence upon wage
deductions, there is some evidence that many such orders have
been made and withdrawn when the employer objected or
threatened termination of the debtor. 0 In other cases, it appears
that Referees have denied confirmation of Wage Earner Plans
because past experience indicated that the debtor's employer
would object.4 ' It is surprising, therefore, that during the thirty
years of Chapter XIII's operation no court has previously passed
upon the question presented by the Jackson case.
Assurance of successful completion of Wage Earner Plans is
enhanced by the result reached in Jackson. This stability is
needed because the benefits of Chapter XIII seem to be declining
as enticements to its use. It is generally believed that the vast
expansion of our economy through credit began after 1938, the
year of the creation of Chapter XIII. In 1969 built-in
obsolescence competes with the normal desire to hold on to
possessions4 2 The "stigma" of being adjudged a bankrupt is
38. Benson, Wage Earner Plans in Bankruptcy Court, 41 MICH. ST. B.J. 10, 13
(Aug. 1962).
39. Allgood, Why Chapter XIII oJ the Bankruptcr Act Works SuccesstillY ill
Birmingham, 15 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 46 (1961); Woodbridge, Wage Earner
Receiverships, 23 J. Axi. JUD. Soc. 242 (1940). A survey of Michigan, Ohio, Virginia
and Wisconsin statutory programs and Chapter Xl11, led the author to the conclusion
that,
[N]o Personal Receivership Act can operate successfully unless the wages of
the debtor are paid by the employer directly to the court under a wage
assignment . . . . Id. at 280.
40. Central Packing Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 672, 675 (1961), reporting a conversation
with a trustee, the arbitrator states:
However, it is the usual practice . . . if the employer objects to making such
deductions and threatens the employee with dismissal, to revoke the order to
the employer . . . . The plan is continued in effect as long as there is any
prospect of succeeding.
41. Allgood, supra note 39, at 47, appparently referring to an earlier mention of
companies which would not cooperate by making wage deductions, the author states:
We try not to confirm cases where the employment is such that our past
experience leads us to believe that the debtor cannot be forced to make
payments.
42. The system of massive production supported by credit consumption has assured
the debtor that, by the time he has completed a Wage Earner Plan, many of his
possessions will be obsolete or worn out and in need of replacement. See A. TROELSTRUP,
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waning due to the increase in the number of bankruptcies 3 the
greater recognition of bankruptcy as a remedy,4 4 and the
impersonality of our large cities. 5 Although the satisfaction of
seeing debts paid remains a valid inducement, it has more
meaning as relief from anxiety manufactured by bill collectors,46
than as virtue's reward. With the assurance provided by the
Jackson decision, it is hoped that the Wage Earner Plan may
begin to realize some of its creator's hopes.
KENNETH GLEASON
CONSUMER PROBLEMS AND PERSONAL FINANCE (3d ed. 1965). In a discussion of this
general problem the author quotes a manufacturing executive: "An engineer's principal
purpose is to create obsolescence." Id. at 13; cj. note 44, injra.
43. Comprehensive statistics are set out in Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771
Bejore a Subconun. oj the House Comnm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser.
10, at 52-60 (1967).
44. See Cowans, supra note 33, at 41; C. Black Power Advocate Threatens
Bankruptcy Boom, 21 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 29 (1966), reporting that a Washington,
D.C. welfare employee has recommended bankruptcy as a means of relief for the
oppressed black population; Do It Yourself Bankruptcy Service Ojfered In C'aliJbrnia,21
PERS. FiN. L.Q. REP. 29 (1966), where the following rhyme was used by a typing service
which offered to ill in bankruptcy forms:
Men and women
Deep in debt
Do not worry
Do not fret
Uncle Sam
Has made a way
Liquidate
Instead of pay.
45. One needs only the experience of living in a few of the large cities of the United
States to agree that "'Who's to know)" is a valid observation.
46. Dr. E. H. Barnes, psychologist and research director for National Accounts
Systems, Inc.- a group of seven successful bill collection agencies in the Chicago
area-has said:
You can't get away from the use of fear in collecting bills. We can't offer the
debtor anything positive like a nice frosty cake. We can only offer relief from
anxiety, and, therefore, the collector has to make sure that a certain amount
of anxiety is present.
H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 202 (1961).

